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1. Coming to America 
 Whether you like it or not, history is on our side. 
  —Khrushchev 
 
Tuesday, September 15, 1959. 
 The former President of the United States left the Carlyle 
Hotel on East Seventy Sixth Street in New York City and set out on a 
brisk morning walk, a puffing press corps in tow. As he quickly made 
his way down Madison Avenue, Harry S. Truman expounded upon the 
latest crisis du jour: juvenile delinquency. Not enough discipline, he 
said. Very soon, the impromptu, ambulatory press conference 
predictably turned to the news on everyone’s mind—Nikita S. 
Khrushchev, the Soviet Premier, later that day would be landing at 
Andrews Air Force Base outside Washington, D.C. A reporter asked if 
it was a good idea for President Eisenhower to invite the Soviet boss to 
this country. “Well, we’ll have to wait and see,” Truman replied 
noncommittally. “I invited Stalin to come but he wouldn’t; he was 
afraid to come.”  
 “Afraid of what?”  
 “He didn’t want to leave his country, which was in turmoil. 
They were still killing people to keep him in power. My experience 
with Stalin was not a happy one. He broke every agreement with 
President Roosevelt and myself. That’s what started the ‘cold war.’”2 
                                                          
2 Look, September 15, 1959, 24 (“Whether you like”); WP, September 
14, 1959, A10; August 4, 1959, A14; NYT, September 16, 1959, 21 
(“Well, we’ll have to”); Truman to Stalin, March 19, 1946; Stalin to 
 Truman had, as he said, invited Stalin to the United States, not 
once but twice. In both instances, the pathologically paranoid Stalin 
begged off. But when Truman’s Republican successor, Dwight 
Eisenhower, asked Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, to visit 
America, the premier quickly accepted. Khrushchev’s eagerness to see 
the United States was well-known. A political cartoon by Herbert 
Block in the Washington Post depicted Khrushchev sitting in the 
Kremlin—his bags packed, his hat on, a U.S.A. guidebook in hand—
impatiently awaiting an invitation. For years he had hoped for the 
chance to come to America; during the Geneva Summit of 1955, he 
tried unsuccessfully to get an invitation. And when his daughter Rada 
and son-in-law Alexei Adzhubei—the editor-in-chief of the official 
government daily newspaper Izvestia—returned from an American visit 
in 1956 laden with photographs of America’s scenic wonders, towering 
skyscrapers, and jammed California freeways, Khrushchev declared, 
“I’ve got to see it for myself.”3 
* * * * * 
 At the very moment Harry Truman was speaking to the press, 
Nikita Khrushchev was en route to America. Early that morning—as 
Radio Moscow proclaimed that Khrushchev had embarked on a 
mission of world peace—a line of Russian-built Zil limousines had 
sped through Moscow to the Vnukovo Airport. Amid well-wishers, 
children bearing bouquets of flowers, and a long line of foreign 
                                                                                                                    
Truman, April 6, 1946; see also telegram (copy), Walter Bedell Smith 
to Jimmy Byrnes, April 5, 1946, Box 164, PSF; Chicago American, 
August 27, 1959 (“small scale politician”), clipping in Vertical File; see 
also Truman to Dave Fidler, January 6, 1960, Box 26, Post Presidential 
File, TL;  
3 Newsweek, September 21, 1959, 41 (“for myself”); see A Portrait of 
Khrushchev, n.d., Box 52, IS, AWF, EL. 
ambassadors, Khrushchev boarded a gargantuan airplane—the Tupolev 
114 turbo-prop airliner—for the eleven hour, non-stop flight to 
Washington.4  
 Since Josef Stalin’s death in 1953, Khrushchev and other 
Soviet leaders had begun to venture beyond the Iron Curtain, visiting 
Western Europe, Asia, and the Subcontinent. In 1956, Khrushchev—
along with Nikolai Bulganin, with whom Khrushchev ostensibly shared 
power at the time—toured England, the first time a Soviet leader had 
visited an allied power. The British press cheekily dubbed the duo “B 
& K,” but the shared arrangement was doomed from the start; the 
colorless Bulganin was soon outmaneuvered by the irrepressible 
Khrushchev, who, by 1956, had seized power and was the indisputable 
leader of the USSR.  
Sixty-five years old in 1959, Khrushchev was a bald, squat 
man who seethed with energy and ambition and possessed an uncanny 
instinct for survival—he had lived through World War II, Stalin’s 
capricious, murderous purges, and the vicious internecine political 
maneuvering following the dictator’s death. Once in power, however, 
Khrushchev quickly demonstrated that he meant to break from Russia’s 
Stalinist past. In February 1956 at the Twentieth Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union—a conference attended by 
Communist leaders from fifty-six countries—Khrushchev, in his 
keynote address, stridently denounced Stalin and the torture and 
executions he ordered. It was, according to Khrushchev’s best 
biographer “the bravest and most reckless thing he ever did,” no mean 
feat in a career full of bravery and recklessness. The speech stunned the 
attendees and, while intended to be confidential, was soon published 
                                                          
4 FF, 46-47; Irving R. Levine, Main Street, U.S.S.R. (Garden City: 
Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1959), 237.  
throughout the world. Khrushchev’s words raised hopes in the west and 
encouraged anti-communist dissidents behind the Iron Curtain. Yet 
when Hungarians rose up against the Soviet–backed regime later that 
year, Khrushchev sent in the implacable Red Army and thousands were 
killed and tens of thousands more banished. Thereafter, any hope of 
significant reform behind the Iron Curtain died and Hungary stood as a 
hideous reminder of what the Soviets were capable of. The Hungarian 
suppression not only dashed western hopes for rapprochement, it cast 
an unmistakable pall, three years later, over the premier’s visit to 
America.5 
 In Russia itself, however, Khrushchev was less a coarse despot 
and more a shrewd politician. He abolished Stalin’s political tribunals 
that had condemned thousands to death, he partially relaxed restrictions 
on arts and literature, and in 1958, he unveiled a Seven-Year Plan 
designed to raise Soviet living standards to a level comparable to those 
of the dynamic capitalist nations. But whether a reformer, a despot, or 
an eager visitor to the United States, Khrushchev remained a true 
believer of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and most Kremlin watchers 
didn’t expect the trip to alter the premier’s conviction of the 
inevitability of communism’s ultimate victory.  
Yet Khrushchev’s preconceptions of capitalist societies in 
general, and America in particular, had but a tenuous relation to the 
realities of 1959. As American analysts of Khrushchev’s personality 
noted, “his understanding of the West is based on Marxist clichés.” A 
month before Khrushchev’s arrival, the New York Times Magazine 
produced a digest of the dictator’s statements; capitalism had 
“enslaved” America, a land where, he insisted, “poverty and mass 
                                                          
5 Taubman, Khrushchev, 274 
 
unemployment reign.” Congress, he thought—devoid of “real 
workers,” “ordinary farmers,” and all but a few token women and 
blacks—was the handmaiden of dominant capital. Party distinctions 
mattered little, for Democratic and Republican leaders alike served “the 
interests of the ruling classes—the capitalists, bankers, land magnates 
and big business men.” Khrushchev’s visit, in some instances, 
disabused the premier of certain preconceptions; in other cases, 
however, his suspicions were duly confirmed.6 
* * * * *  
 High above the Atlantic Ocean on that fall morning in 1959, 
Nikita Khrushchev could reflect on his improbable ascent to the 
pinnacle of the communist world. His story began in an earthen hut in 
the impoverished Russian village of Kalinovka near the Ukrainian 
border in April 1894. Little in his family’s story suggested that his life 
would vary from that of millions of peasants who toiled in grinding 
poverty under the Tsarist Regime. “My grandfather was a serf,” he 
once said, “the property of a landlord who could sell him if he wished, 
or trade him for a hunting dog.” Khrushchev’s father farmed in the 
growing season and worked in the Donbas coal mines during Russia’s 
                                                          
6 LAE, September 18, 1959, 1; WP, September 14, 1959, A1, A10; FF, 
46 (“supreme social problem”), 49; see Levine, Main Street, U.S.S.R., 
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Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York and London: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 299; Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita 
Khrushchev, 331-32; A Portrait of Khrushchev, n.d.; Khrushchev 
biographical material re Khrushchev Visit, September 4, 1959, Box 52, 
IS, AWF; see also Biographic Reports, September 8, 1959, Box 64, CF, 
WHCF, EL. 
brutal winters. Young Nikita was introduced early to the rigors of 
Russian peasantry, herding the landlord’s livestock as a boy—he later 
boasted that he went to work when he learned to walk. By the time he 
was fourteen, Nikita had joined his father in the mines, dislodging slag 
from boilers. It was there that young Khrushchev became intimately 
acquainted with the crude and dispiriting working conditions brought 
about by Russia’s Industrial Revolution, truncated though it was: scores 
killed by explosions or buried alive in mine collapses, meager wages, 
ghastly sanitation, deadening routine, and a countryside laden with coal 
dust. Predictably, crime and alcoholism flourished, and Donbas became 
an embodiment of every evil laid at capitalism’s door, a region so 
stereotypically oppressive that Khrushchev once remarked that Marx 
must have “actually been at the mines” as he formulated his doctrines. 
His experience convinced him that capitalists, regardless of nationality, 
were “all alike”—demanding arduous labor in return for a pittance. 
And so he became a communist.7 
 He might have taken a different path. Although young Nikita 
received little formal education, he had shown real academic 
potential—he had, ironically, attended a church school for a while and 
earned a prize, he later recalled, “because I knew the gospel by heart.” 
His father, however, would have none of it: “After a year or two,” 
Nikita remembered, “I had learnt to count up to thirty and my father 
decided that was enough of schooling. He said I would never have 
more than thirty rubles to count anyway.” Khrushchev always regretted 
that he possessed “no education and not enough culture. . . . All I had 
was four classes in a church school and then, instead of high school, 
just a smattering of higher education.” But looking back, he insisted 
that life itself had taught him well: “It thrashes and bangs and teaches 
                                                          
7 Taubman, Khrushchev, 31 
you.” The Donbas mines, Khrushchev claimed, were “the working 
man’s Cambridge, a ‘university’ for the unfortunate people of Russia.”8 
 Although Khrushchev would later attempt to elide his peasant 
origins, he worked diligently a rising Communist official and later as 
premier to improve the wretchedness of life in the countryside, to 
narrow the chasm between rural poverty and urban affluence. Late in 
his career he often visited Kalinovka and saw to it that it modernized, 
as if he believed it to be his personal responsibility to drag Russian 
peasants into the twentieth century. 
 At twenty, Nikita escaped the mines by way of a 
metalworking apprenticeship and soon married Yefrosinia Pisareva, a 
daughter of a mine elevator operator with whom he had two children. 
They lived—for the time and place—a fairly comfortable life in a 
commodious apartment. “Years later, after the Revolution,” he candidly 
admitted in his memoirs, “it was painful for me to remember that as a 
worker under capitalism I’d had much better living conditions than my 
fellow workers now living under Soviet power.”9  
Khrushchev might have lived out his life as a member of the 
Russian petit bourgeoisie, perhaps rising to factory manager or entering 
the professions as an engineer. But the young man stood at the 
intersection of war and revolution. Just as Nikita and his wife began 
their lives together, the Great War erupted, a conflagration that would 
destroy Russia’s Tsarist Regime and convince young Nikita to become 
a radical political leader, that would take Harry Truman off his 
                                                          
8 Taubman, Khrushchev, 43-44 (“no education”), 75; 
9 NYT, September 12, 1971, 78-79; KRLT, 87-88 (“Years later”); 
Taubman, Khrushchev, 18-29 (“After a year;” “the idiocy of;” “no 
matter how hard”), 30-41; also Khrushchev’s memoirs partly quoted on 
40; Daniel Schorr, Staying Tuned: A Life in Journalism (New York and 
other cities: Washington Square Press, 2001), 113 (“Later”). 
Missouri farm and sent him to Europe, that would, in time, create in 
Adolf Hitler such a seething hatred that he would initiate another, still 
more catastrophic conflagration.  
 After the communist revolution of 1917, Khrushchev joined 
the Rutchenkovo Soviet and fought with the Red Guards of the Ninth 
Army in the Ukraine during the Russian Civil War. Although by 
temperament far closer to the more moderate Mensheviks, Khrushchev 
belatedly and reluctantly joined the ruthless Bolsheviks in 1918. 
Attached to the army’s political department, Khrushchev recruited 
troops into communist units, but he persuaded them not with Marxist 
dogma but with the pragmatic argument that the revolution and their 
personal goals were intertwined. 
  While Khrushchev was fighting to advance the revolution, his 
wife died of typhus, leaving him with two small children. He soon 
remarried a young and troubled single mother, but the marriage was 
unhappy from the start and quickly fell apart—a shattering episode that 
was long kept a family secret. Nikita’s third marriage to Nina Petrovna 
Kukharchu in 1924, however, lasted the rest of his life. Young, 
intelligent, and a committed communist, Nina ran the Khrushchev 
household with a firm hand and rigorously instilled high expectations 
in both her three children and two step-children. Nikita and Nina’s son 
Sergei, born in 1935, recalled that although no one questioned his 
father’s authority, the “real power in the family was exercised by 
Mama.” The uncomplaining, smiling, stout, grandmotherly persona she 
exhibited during her American odyssey was authentic, but it belied her 
intelligence and determination.10  
                                                          
10 Taubman, Khrushchev, 37-61 (“wasn’t a man of;” “But real”), 70, 
109, 111, 113, 156-58; NYT, September 26, 1959, 12; August 22, 1984, 
D23; Sergei Khrushchev, Khrushchev, 11, 22-23.  
 Khrushchev’s rise in the Communist Party, meanwhile, 
continued apace. He rose from a minor position in his mining town of 
Yuzovka, to party leadership in Petrovo-Marinsky, to historic Kiev, and 
finally to Moscow itself. By 1930 he was a party secretary, a protégé of 
Lazar M. Kaganovich, the Stalinist Ukrainian leader who ironically 
would participate in an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Khrushchev 
decades later. By the mid-1930s, Nikita had made his way into Stalin’s 
inner circle, a distinctly dangerous environment, given Stalin’s 
murderous paranoia. Although Khrushchev was hardworking, 
ambitious, intelligent, and well-connected, there were hundreds of 
apparatchiks just like him who fell victim to the purges. “I remember 
the oppressive circumstances in Moscow during the period from 1934 
to 1939,” recalled Andrei Gromyko. “People would walk along the 
street with tense expressions on their faces. Workers and staff in 
institutes and enterprises were afraid to talk to each other, unless they 
were close friends. It was well known that every night the NKVD [the 
Soviet secret police] were ‘taking’ people, as we said then. . . . Nothing 
would be heard from them again.” Of those who served with 
Khrushchev on the Communist Party Central Committee in the mid-
1930s, nearly three-quarters were arrested and executed within five 
years. In the end, Khrushchev was one of the few left standing, a man 
who would eventually denounce Stalin and help bury his cult of 
personality.11 
Khrushchev, according to one of his staffers, possessed “great 
natural gifts,” including the ability to improvise and, when the situation 
                                                          
11 NYT, September 12, 1971, 79; Andrei Gromyko, Memoirs (New 
York and other cities: Doubleday, 1989), 365 (“I remember the”); 
Orlando Figes, The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin’s Russia (New 
York: Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 2007); Taubman, Khrushchev, 73-
74 (“holocaust”). 
called for it, to act boldly. Khrushchev as well had a gift for 
establishing rapport with subordinates. In the mid-1930s, while he was 
a member of the Central Committee and party boss of Moscow 
Province, Khrushchev painstakingly oversaw the construction of the 
capital’s grand Metro subway. As the work progressed, he would 
descend into the tunnels with the laborers, occasionally manning a 
jackhammer and speaking to the workers in their own crude lingo. His 
peers nicknamed him “Comrade Lavatory Lover” because of his 
insistence that the workers be given adequate facilities. Khrushchev 
also oversaw the distribution of ration cards, rooted out corruption, and 
encouraged hungry Muscovite workers to raise more of their own 
food.12 
 Through it all, Khrushchev was a survivor. Other communist 
leaders thought him Stalin’s “liubimchik,” his pet—Stalin himself 
thought of Khrushchev as the “jolly Cossack” and shook with laughter 
as he made him dance the hopak at the dictator’s Blizhnyaya dacha. 
With no discernable ambition, Khrushchev seemed, according to Fedor 
Burlatsky, “just a reliable executor of another’s will.” But Burlatsky, a 
speechwriter and intimate advisor of Khrushchev’s, knew his boss was 
no fool. Although seemingly benign and willing to passively suffer 
humiliation, Khrushchev was biding his time. As one historian 
discerned, “Khrushchev’s bright porcine eyes, chunky physique and 
                                                          
12 NYT, September 12, 1971, 77, 78 (“My grandfather was;” “all 
alike”), 79; Fedor Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring 
(1988; translation by Daphne Skillen; London: Weidenfield and 
Nicolson, 1991), 1, 44 (“in the miner’s”); Time, January 6, 1958, 17 
(“Comrade Lavatory”); Taubman, Khrushchev, 90-91 (“I had to make 
up;” “gaps in education”), 317-18, 369. 
toothy smile with its golden teeth exuded primitive coarseness and 
Promethean energy but camouflaged his cunning.”13 
 Impressed with Khrushchev’s obedience and energy, Stalin in 
early 1938 dispatched him to the Ukraine, where Khrushchev made his 
base of operations for the next eleven years. 
Aside from Russia itself, Ukraine was the USSR’s most valued 
possession, a region whose economic and cultural vitality extended 
back to Kiev’s imperial ascendancy in the 10th century. But thereafter 
the region had been subjugated and dismembered by Russians and 
Hapsburgs, and Stalin ruthlessly eliminated any remaining nationalist 
sentiment. From his sumptuous dacha, Khrushchev cultivated the 
Ukrainian intellectual and scientific community and won praise for the 
region’s increased agricultural and industrial productivity. Yet under 
his watch the atrocities continued, including arrests, forced confessions, 
and executions.14 
 Indeed, and inevitably, serving as he did as a lackey of Stalin, 
Khrushchev was complicit in the madman’s crimes—“My arms are 
bloody up to the elbows,” he despondently admitted in retirement. 
“That is the most terrible thing that lies in my soul.” Burlatsky claimed 
that Khrushchev played an essential role in the purges of the 1930s, 
and, indeed, in recently opened Russian archives, Khrushchev’s 
                                                          
13 Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring, 1, 42-43 (“If 
Brutus;” “jolly Cossack”); see Time, January 6, 1958, 17; William J. 
Tompson, Khrushchev: A Political Life (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1995), 105; see Harrison Salisbury, “Khrushchev: Shift in Soviet Path,” 
NYT, September 12, 1971, 77. See also Simon S. Montefiore, Stalin: 
The Court of the Red Tsar (New York: Vintage Books, 2003), 168 
(“meteoric bumpkin”), 175 
14 Taubman, Khrushchev, 114-46; see also Burlatsky, Khrushchev and 
the First Russian Spring, 56-60 
signature appears side by side with Stalin’s on many of the documents 
condemning people to “liquidation.”15 
During World War II—Russia’s “Great Patriotic War”—
Khrushchev rose to the rank of lieutenant general, although his war 
record was uneven at best. He oversaw the successful defenses of key 
urban centers such as Stalingrad and Kursk, but he also supervised the 
disastrous Kharkov offensive of May 1942 that resulted in almost 
300,000 casualties. If nothing else, he, like survivors of the war, was 
left at the end of it all with a profound abhorrence of war. 
In 1945 the devastation in Russia was staggering: Twenty-
seven million dead, hundreds of towns and villages destroyed, tens of 
thousands of factories leveled, thousands of miles of rail lines wrecked, 
and nearly a third of the wealth of the Soviet Union wiped out. In the 
Ukraine, the devastation was worse still: two million deported to 
German labor camps and one in six dead. Conditions scarcely improved 
during “peacetime,” in part because of Khrushchev’s renewal of 
collectivized agriculture and his brutal suppression of nationalist 
uprisings. In all, Soviet authorities executed some 200,000 countrymen 
after 1945 and sent twice as many into exile or prison. Yet Khrushchev 
weirdly intermingled such brutal methods with a sincere desire to 
improve the lives of the Ukrainians. He directed the region’s economic 
reconstruction and even risked his life by challenging Stalin’s orders he 
thought detrimental to his homeland.16 
                                                          
15 Nina Khrushcheva, “The day Khrushchev buried Stalin,” Los 
Angeles Times online, February 19, 2006 (“up to the elbows;” “kindly 
old”) (February 22, 2006). Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First 
Russian Spring, 1, 56 (“The gloomiest”) 
16 U.S. News & World Report, September 7, 1959, 62-63; Edward 
Crankshaw, Khrushchev: A Career (New York: Viking Press, 1966), 
137-47; Taubman, Khrushchev, 149-207; see KR, 165-226.  
 By late 1949, Khrushchev, always the survivor, was back in 
Moscow and back in Stalin’s inner circle, albeit in a diminished 
capacity. Yet over the next few years, he rose in the bureaucracy if for 
no other reason than Stalin murdered most every official ahead of him; 
by the time Stalin died in 1953, only Khrushchev and the colorless 
Bulganin were left, both of them saved by their self-evident lack of 
charisma.17 
 Even as Stalin lay dying, few would have thought that 
Khrushchev would eventually succeed him. Hours before his demise, 
Stalin parceled out positions like a robber baron on his deathbed: 
Georgy Malenkov would become the head of the Soviet state; 
Lavrentiy Beria would command the secret police; Vyacheslav 
Molotov would take the foreign ministry; and Khrushchev would 
oversee agriculture, although he was secretly assured he would also get 
command of the military. Despite these bequests, plots and counterplots 
swirled even as mourners filled Red Square; each of the presumptive 
heirs conspired to eliminate their rivals.18  
The new leaders, like Stalin, wholly underrated this Ukrainian 
“jolly Cossack.” After becoming First Secretary of the Communist 
Party in 1953, Khrushchev sensed his opening when Bulganin—a man 
who inspired confidence in no one—became Prime Minister in 1955. 
Slowly but inexorably, Khrushchev assumed parity then superiority and 
swiftly pushed Bulganin aside. After the putative co-leaders met with 
                                                          
17 Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, Cold Peace: Stalin and the 
Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945-1953 (New York and other cities: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 93, 94, 146. 
18 Donald Rayfield, Stalin and His Hangmen (New York: Random 
House, 2004), 460-66; Taubman, Khrushchev, 248-57, Tompson, 
Khrushchev, 120-22; Robert Service, Stalin: A Biography (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2005), 459-60, 585-90; KRGT, 
100. 
U.S. officials at the Geneva Summit that summer, it quickly became 
apparent who was the first among equals. President Eisenhower, after 
Khrushchev summarily dismissed America’s “Open Skies” initiative—
an audacious proposal that would allow each nation to conduct aerial 
surveillance of the other’s military capabilities—knew, as he later 
wrote, “who was the real boss” of the Soviet Union. In all, Khrushchev 
had, as Saul Bellow put it, “what it took to finish the course: the nerves, 
the control, the patience, the piercing ambition, the strength to kill and 
to endure the threat of death.”19 
* * * * * 
  
No matter how callously Nikita Khrushchev pursued his 
ambitions, he genuinely wanted to improve the lives of the Soviet 
people. Once having assumed power, he freed millions from the gulags, 
eased censorship, lifted economic restrictions, and helped create 
cultural contacts. Relieved Russians called it simply “The Thaw.”20 
                                                          
19 Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, 94; Taubman, Khrushchev, 370 
(“a fool”); Tompson, Khrushchev, 135-42; Roy Medvedev and Zhores 
Medvedev, Khrushchev: The Years in Power (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1976), 4; John L. Gaddis, The Cold War: A New 
History (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), 72-73; DDE to C.D. 
Jackson, September 23, 1959, PDDE, XX, 1670 (“who was the real 
boss”); Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (Garden City: 
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), 519-22; see also CBS Reports, 
“Eisenhower on the Presidency,” Part II, as broadcast over CBS 
Television Network, Thursday, November 23, 1961, 19, (an interview 
of Eisenhower by Walter Cronkite), typed copy in Series I, Box 1, 
WJFP; Saul Bellow, “Literary Notes on Khrushchev,” It All Adds Up, 
33. 
20 Edward Crankshaw, Khrushchev’s Russia (Middlesex and other 
cities: Penguin Books, 1959), 99-139 (“The Great Thaw,” “that the 
Communist idea”).  
 Yet the thaw was partial at best and certainly did not signal the 
onset of artistic freedom, as USSR’s premier poet, Boris Pasternak, 
soon discovered. In 1957, the publication of his novel Doctor Zhivago 
enraged Soviet officials, who tried to suppress the book, thinking it 
anti-Bolshevik. The story revolved around Dr. Yuri Zhivago, a fiercely 
independent individual struggling against collectivism in Revolutionary 
Russia. American authorities—believing the book to have “great 
propaganda value”—instructed the CIA to smuggle translated editions 
into Russia and distribute copies as widely as possible. The book and 
its suppression, they believed, was an “opportunity to make Soviet 
citizens wonder what is wrong with their government, when a fine 
literary work by the man acknowledged to be the greatest living 
Russian writer is not even available in his own country in his own 
language for his own people to read.”21 
Doctor Zhivago quickly became an international bestseller and 
was eventually translated into seventeen languages. When it was 
awarded the 1958 Nobel Prize for Literature, Pasternak became a 
celebrity in the West and made the cover of Time. But the novel deeply 
embarrassed Russian officials and Pasternak was told in no uncertain 
terms that if he went to Stockholm to receive his prize he would not be 
allowed back into Russia. The cowed Pasternak refused the prize, 
comparing himself to “a beast in an enclosure” whose only solace was 
                                                          




zhivago-explore-the-cache-of-documents/924/ accessed April 10, 2014. 
The CIA’s work in this regard wasn’t uncommon; the agency 
distributed approximately 10 million copies of books and magazines 
behind the Iron Curtain. Peter Finn and Petra Couvee, The Zhivago 
Affair: The Kremlin, the CIA, and the Battle Over a Forbidden Book 
(New York: Pantheon, 2014). 
that “I am near my grave,” and begged to be allowed to remain in his 
homeland. In America, Eisenhower professed to be “shocked” and 
saddened that such “a creative mind” was told, in essence, “‘you will 
either write what we say or you won’t write.’” Eleanor Roosevelt, 
during a visit to the Soviet Union in 1958, gently lobbied Khrushchev 
on Pasternak’s behalf; the artist, she said, clearly loved his country and 
its people. At the end of it all, the affair exposed the fact that Russia 
had not so completely broken with the ways of Stalin; though life was 
better, repression continued.22 
As embarrassed as the Soviets were by the Pasternak affair, 
they were equally proud of their achievements in space exploration. In 
October 1957 Russia launched the world’s first man-made satellite, 
Sputnik; a month later, Sputnik II followed, carrying the first living 
creature—a doomed dog named Laika—into space. Meanwhile, Russia 
continued to make significant advances in Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missile technology. America now confronted not only a Soviet Union 
armed with nuclear weapons but possessed of the capability to deliver 
them anywhere on the planet.  
And then, just three days before Khrushchev’s arrival, the 
Soviets slammed Lunik II, an 860-pound missile, into the surface of the 
moon. It was the first time humans had made contact with an 
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extraterrestrial object, and it was yet another first for the USSR. 
American missile technology, meanwhile, literally could not get off the 
ground. In response to Sputnik launches of late 1957, America 
inaugurated Project Vanguard and with great publicity, attempted to put 
a small, six pound TV3 satellite into orbit. On December 6, 1957, the 
Vanguard rocket rose four feet and promptly exploded as millions 
watched on live television. The failure of “Kaputnik,” as it was 
instantly labeled by the American media, wasn’t the last; of ten 
subsequent Vanguard launches over the next two years, only three 
actually made it into orbit.23  
* * * * *  
 
 As Khrushchev’s visit approached, journalists and pundits 
cranked out endless stories on the visitor and his land, effectively 
debriefing the American public. Former New York Times’ Moscow 
Bureau chief William Jorden wrote in the New York Times Sunday 
magazine two days before Khrushchev’s arrival that the premier was “a 
man of many faces and many facets, to some a buffoon, to others a 
genius, yet really neither.” His talk of co-existence with the West, said 
Jorden, was difficult to square with his unshakeable belief in the 
inevitability of communism’s triumph. Jorden, moreover, predicted that 
nothing Khrushchev would see in the United States would shake his 
faith in communism. That same day, William Hearst Jr. printed an 
“Open Letter to Mr. K” on page one of the Los Angeles Examiner in 
which he insisted that America’s “ruling class” was not, contrary to 
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Soviet belief, a clique of capitalists and their political lackeys, but the 
American electorate itself. Proof of capitalism’s superiority could be 
seen in the country’s material prosperity and political freedom: 
abundant cars, plentiful goods, affordable housing, free elections, and a 
free press. Hearst meant for his broadside, if nothing else, to brace his 
fellow Americans against the ideological wares peddled by the 
communist huckster. Similarly, David Lawrence’s right-leaning U. S. 
News & World Report sought to strengthen America’s ideological 
fortifications, warning its readers not to be fooled by the empty and 
disingenuous talk of “peaceful coexistence.” Yet there was little chance 
that Khrushchev would seduce Americans with his brand of socialism: 
as the New York Times wrote, “Too many Americans remember Korea 
in 1950, East Berlin in 1953 and Budapest in 1956.”24 
In August, Khrushchev had told the press in Moscow that his 
venture to America was a mission of peace, that he was ready “to turn 
my pockets out to show I am harmless.” But predictably, conservative 
publications in America were profoundly suspicious; the U.S. News 
pointedly reminded its readers of Khrushchev’s role in Stalin’s purges, 
his repression of the Hungarians, and his penchant for “stirring up 
trouble around the globe and threatening civilization with a nuclear 
World War III.” Meanwhile, Philip Burnham in the Catholic 
Commonweal declared that Khrushchev’s claim of peaceful 
competition with the West was “palpable propaganda” and that “if 
Khrushchev and the movement he heads are not an enemy, it would 
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seem there is no enemy.” Hearst’s Los Angeles Examiner proclaimed 
that “behind the pudgy amiability and the bland words of peace is a 
shrewd, cunning, alert, completely dedicated Communist, full of 
proverbs and equally full of guile.”25  
In their attempt to better understand the new premier and his 
temperament, American officials sought the help of psychologists. 
Some analysts made the same mistake that the premier’s Soviet rivals 
had: Khrushchev was, according to one estimate, “clowning, crude, 
unpredictable peasant—a man of little consequence, something of a 
court jester,” a “uniquely clever, deliberate and far-seeing political 
dealer” whose “homely, bumptious mannerisms are merely tricks out of 
a bag.” Others, however, were more astute, concluding that the premier 
neither understood nor appreciated Western-style democracy but 
regarded the United States with “a blend of awe and resentment.” 
Impetuous, but never reckless or paranoid, Khrushchev was a survivor 
and a populist, “a handshaking, back-slapping, grass-roots politician 
who could draw a good vote in any democracy and a shrewd and 
ruthless manipulator of power in the best totalitarian tradition.” These 
aspects of Khrushchev’s personality—at once serious and mercurial, 
bombastic and jovial—soon became familiar to Americans. Eisenhower 
likened Khrushchev’s behavior to that of a diabetic who didn’t adjust 
well to his insulin. Even Nikita’s wife admitted as much; on the plane 
to America, Nina Petrovna remarked that her husband was “either all 
the way up or all the way down.”26  
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 Since 1955, Khrushchev had become more familiar to the 
American people, having appeared more and more frequently in the 
American media. His first American television interview—an hour-
long interview on CBS’s Face the Nation—was broadcast in 1957. “By 
turns ingratiating, evasive, and stern,” Khrushchev “carried it off 
magnificently,” recalled CBS’s Moscow correspondent Daniel Schorr 
decades later, Skillfully deflecting questions about the invasion of 
Hungary and the jamming of U.S. radio broadcasts in the USSR, 
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Khrushchev called for peace and improved U.S.-Soviet relations. It was 
a public relations triumph: “Khrushchev had,” Schorr continued, 
“appeared in America’s living rooms—real, robust, and unthreatening.” 
When the reporter told the Soviet boss that his TV appearance had 
made him a celebrity in the U.S., Khrushchev self-effacingly replied, 
“If American television depends on me to be its star, it will be bankrupt 
in a month.”27 
 For weeks, American media parsed the interview. “For a 
layman whose mental image of a Communist chief might be confined 
to impersonal headlines or the heavily-guarded figure in conventional 
newsreels,” wrote Jack Gould in the New York Times, “the hour was an 
absorbing revelation. The cause of communism at the moment has a 
slick salesman.” The editors of the New York Times hailed the 
broadcast and hoped for a reciprocal interview in which Eisenhower 
would appear on Soviet radio and television in a “free competition of 
ideas.” During a press conference three days later, the President was 
asked if he would request equal time on Soviet media—an idea that 
was in fact being bandied about within the administration. Eisenhower 
replied that if guarantees were given that content would be neither 
distorted nor censored, “somebody in this Government will be glad to 
accept.” But Ike’s polite comments masked his profound irritation. Two 
years later at Geneva, the president had proposed—and the Russians 
had rejected—just such a suggestion that reciprocal transmissions 
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would be broadcast into each country. As Eisenhower later complained 
to Bernard Baruch, too few Americans understood the contrast between 
a dictatorial regime’s iron grip on media and a free society where 
private corporations could broadcast with “no responsibility to 
determine whether such action is to the national advantage or not.”28 
 A few months later in the fall of 1957, Pulitzer Prize winning 
journalist Scotty Reston landed an extended interview with Khrushchev 
in Moscow published in three parts in the New York Times. The 
communist boss ranged over a variety of subjects, including weapons 
technology, disarmament, Germany, the Middle East, and Turkey. A 
good Marxist, Khrushchev predicted that the state and, indeed, all 
means of coercion would wither away and that a brave new world of 
freedom, Soviet style, would eventually spread throughout the world. 
Khrushchev, at about the same time, told the right-wing publishing 
magnate William Randolph Hearst Jr. that communism would 
inevitably prevail over capitalism. In the meantime, Khrushchev 
continued, capitalist and communist regimes should strive for 
disarmament, trade, and peaceful competition. “Mr. Hearst, convey this 
to your President.”29 
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 That fall, Khrushchev granted still another high-profile 
interview, this one with former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt during her 
tour of the USSR. He had “all the bearing of an Eastern European 
peasant,” she reported; “His fingers, his hands, his whole build is that 
of a peasant. He has the peasant canniness and cautiousness, but he is, 
on the other hand, extremely articulate.” And although she had been 
warned that Khrushchev was “an impossible person, vulgar, drinking, 
disagreeable,” Roosevelt was pleasantly surprised to find that “he was 
none of those things.”30 
Despite his charm, few had forgotten what Khrushchev was 
capable of—especially in the wake of the brutal repression of the 
Hungarian revolt. “Who would have thought,” asked Edward 
Crankshaw, a British expert on Russian affairs, “that the genial, plain-
speaking soul on the TV screens of America . . . had not long before 
put down the Hungarian revolution in blood and torture?” The 
“Hungarian Freedom Fighter”—armed, bleeding, and determined—was 
Time’s “Man of the Year” for 1956, an unmistakable condemnation of 
Soviet actions. Yet the very next year, after surviving an attempted 
coup by anti-reform Stalinists Molotov, Malenkov, and his old mentor 
Lazar Kaganovich, Khrushchev himself was Time’s “Man of the Year” 
(”Butcher of the Year would have been more appropriate,” complained 
one Time reader.) It was an object lesson for the West, a demonstration, 
according to the New York Times, of just “how rapidly Soviet troops in 
large numbers could be moved into a neighboring country.” 31 
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Indeed, Hungary loomed over Khrushchev’s visit to America. 
Throughout his tour, thousands of Hungarian expatriates protested, 
unable to see any substantive difference between Stalin and his 
successor. The crushing of the Hungarian revolt was also a clarifying 
event for the few remaining far-leftists in America. As leftwing 
journalist I. F. Stone wrote in November 1956, Hungary destroyed any 
lingering illusions about the Soviets. “An era is dying,” he wrote in his 
Weekly, “the era in which many of us intellectuals grew up, the era of 
the Russian Revolution, the era in which—for all its faults and evils—
defense of that revolution was somehow the moral duty of all 
progressive minded men. That is over, and with it the companion 
notion . . . that Russia was not an imperial power.”32 
* * * * *  
 
Khrushchev was, in many ways, the prototypical Russian: a 
weird amalgam of confidence and insecurity. On the one hand, he was 
a supremely proud man—proud of his achievements, proud of his 
ideology, proud of what his country had achieved in the recent past—in 
particular, the successful launches of Sputnik and Lunik missions. The 
invitation itself was a barometer of how far the USSR had come from 
the time that the US refused to even recognize its existence. “Who 
would have guessed twenty years ago,” Khrushchev enthused, “that the 
most powerful capitalist country in the world would invite a 
Communist to visit? This is incredible. Today they have to take us into 
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account. It’s our strength that led to this—they have to recognize our 
existence and our power.”33 
At the same time, Khrushchev possessed, according to the 
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, “an inferiority complex that 
still goes very deep” and was “extremely sensitive to any imagined 
slight.” At root, Khrushchev, like Russian rulers stretching back 
centuries, yearned to be respected, to be considered a leader of the first 
order. Their fear of being slighted or disrespected gave rise to a 
ubiquitous suspicion and a penchant for overreacting to perceived 
slights: “We will not allow anyone to push us around or to sit on our 
necks,” Khrushchev declared. Thus, for example, when Khrushchev 
learned he was to meet Eisenhower at a place called “Camp David,” 
instinctively he dreaded he was being shunted off to a compound 
reserved for the unworthy.” Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, after 
meeting Khrushchev in 1958, aptly summed up these contradictory 
characteristics when he described Khrushchev as “insecure in a 
superconfident way.” As Foy Kohler perceptively remarked, “it must 
never be forgotten that the reverse side of Khrushchev’s arrogance is 
the most super-colossal inferiority complex in the world.”34 
 This compound of insecurity and audacity was given tangible 
form by the very aircraft that brought Khrushchev to the U.S.—the 
gargantuan Tupolev 114, the world’s largest passenger plane. Built by 
the Soviet state-run airline Aeroflot and unveiled in 1957, the jet-
powered propeller aircraft had a wingspan of over 177 feet and could 
fly nonstop from Moscow to New York in just over eleven hours, a 
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record at the time. In Khrushchev’s mind, the plane was the latest 
instance of Russian achievement—yet further proof that the Soviet 
Union could not only compete but surpass the West. 
Yet, more accurately, the airliner could be seen as an 
expression of the limitations of Russian technology. Though physically 
impressive, the TU-114, even as it rolled down the runway for the first 
time, was outdated. Its counter-rotating jet-prop technology had long 
been abandoned by American aircraft builders. In fact, by 1958, 
Douglas Aircraft and Boeing had already introduced four-engine all-jet 
707s and DC-8s into domestic and international service. As well, the 
TU-114’s navigational system—the navigator sat in the nose of the 
plane, much like World War II-era American bombers—was outdated 
and inefficient and forced Soviet pilots to fly “by the seat of their 
pants.” “If this is Russia’s ‘finest,’” wrote Fulton Lewis Jr., a columnist 
for King Features Syndicate, “this country doesn’t have much to worry 
about.”35 
 The TU-114 also had structural issues. After a test flight in 
May, tiny cracks appeared in at least one of the engines and Soviet 
officials were alarmed enough to try to dissuade Khrushchev from 
flying to America in the aircraft. But when the premier asked the TU-
114’s designer, Andrei Tupolev, about its safety, the 70-year-old 
designer declared that “I’m absolutely certain you won’t have any 
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trouble.” In fact, Tupolev was so sure of the plane’s safety that he 
asked Khrushchev to take his son, Alyosha, with him to America. 
Nonetheless, a technical team accompanied Khrushchev to America, 
monitoring the engines throughout the flight. “They sat in front of 
complicated control boards and panels with a multitude of blinking 
green lights,” said Sergei Khrushchev, their presence causing a good 
deal of nervousness. “We were drawn,” he continued, “as if by 
magnets, to their boxes, checking to make sure that no red lights went 
on. We couldn’t forget those microscopic cracks.” At once strong and 
flawed, impressive and vaguely ridiculous, proud and passé, the plane 
was a window into the Russian psyche.36 
* * * * *  
  
As the TU-114 prepared for landing at Andrews Air Force 
Base, the Soviet press corps proclaimed that “the historic moment of 
the meeting of the heads of two Great Powers, on which the attention of 
the peoples of the whole world is focused, is nearing.” As the plane 
descended sunny and beautiful day, the Soviet leader spotted clusters of 
Americans in festive summertime clothes—“like a flowerbed of 
different colors.” “My nerves” he recalled, “were strained with 
excitement.” Using the full length of the runway, the sleek airliner 
touched down at 12:21 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time, blue smoke puffing 
from its huge wheels. Awed by the plane’s sheer size, the waiting 
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crowd gasped audibly. Nikita Khrushchev’s journey into America had 
begun.37 
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